The Economics of New Goods by Shane M. Greenstein
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Economics of New Goods
Volume Author/Editor: Timothy F. Bresnahan and Robert J. Gordon, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-07415-3
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/bres96-1
Publication Date: January 1996
Chapter Title: From Superminis to Supercomputers: Estimating Surplus in
the Computing Market
Chapter Author: Shane M. Greenstein
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6071
Chapter pages in book: (p. 329 - 372)8  From Superminis to 
Supercomputers: Estimating 
Surplus in the 
Computing Market 
Shane M. Greenstein 
8.1  Introduction 
Innovation is rampant in adolescent industries. Old products die or evolve 
and new products replace them. Each new generation of products offers new 
features, extends the range of existing features, or lowers the cost of obtaining 
old features. Vendors imitate one another’s products, so that what had been a 
novelty becomes a standard feature in all subsequent generations. Depending 
on the competitive environment and the type of innovation, prices may or may 
not reflect design changes. 
The computer industry of the late 1960s and 1970s experienced remarkable 
growth and learning. At the start of the period several technological uncertain- 
ties defied easy resolution. Most knowledgeable observers could predict the 
direction of technical change, but not its rate. Vendors marketed hundreds of 
new product designs throughout the  1970s, and a fraction of  those products 
became commercially successful. In time the industry took on a certain matu- 
rity and predictability.  By the late 1970s, both buyers and sellers understood 
the technical trajectory of the industry’s products. Even the least experienced 
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users understood  the capabilities and limits of the most popular commercial 
systems. 
This paper attempts to measure the economic benefits that accrued to buyers 
from technological innovation in the computer industry. Its thesis is that many 
innovations that created economic value in this period are associated with ex- 
tensions  in computing  capabilities,  as distinguished  from declines in prices 
which occurred at the same time as the extensions. This paper does not argue 
that price decreases were unimportant to buyers, but that price decreases alone 
tell an incomplete story about the welfare improvements realized by buyers. 
This thesis goes to the heart of the relationship  between  rapid “constant- 
quality” price declines and the inferred improvement in economic welfare. The 
open issue concerns whether constant-quality price indexes provide the same 
information about the experience of a buyer who continues to buy computer 
systems with a similar set of characteristics as about that of a buyer who takcs 
advantage of the availability  of characteristics  that  did not previously  exist. 
There are reasons to think constant-quality  price indexes do not provide the 
same information  on  both  types  of  buyers.  The  correspondence between 
constant-quality  price  indexes  and economic welfare  will  be  weaker when 
product characteristics cannot be repackaged (e.g., see Trajtenberg 1990). For 
example, one large computer system may provide more services to a buyer than 
two systems with exactly half the measurable characteristics. The appropriate 
welfare  issue  concerns  buyer  satisfaction  with  the  extension  of  product 
space-that  is, the extension of the range of quality available. If a set of adopt- 
ers of new products could be accurately surveyed, how much would they be 
willing to pay not to give up the new capability associated with extensions of 
computers? A large body of work on cost-of-living indexes suggests that the 
“willingness to pay” for product extensions may have a nonlinear relationship 
to constant-quality price decreases.’ 
The problem considered here does not lend itself to a single statistical test 
or experiment. To reach a convincing conclusion, it would be better to see if a 
variety of information sources point in a similar direction.  This paper addresses 
several related questions. First, what innovations in this period are associated 
with extensions of capabilities? Second, do buyers adopt products that embody 
extensions of capabilities? Third, how could a measurement framework repre- 
sent that action?  Are extensions embodied only in increases in capacity or other 
measurable features of a computer system? 
Many of these questions require an explicit supply and demand framework. 
1.  It is well known that  there are problems with  using  price indexes  to measure the benefits 
associated with new goods. The same problems arise if extensions of product space (e.g.,  inventing 
a system with computing capacity that is twice as high as any previous system’s) are associated 
with new services. In either event, there is an important issue regarding the procedures for incorpo- 
rating  new goods into price  indexes. As Triplett  (1989) argues, the central issue in  developing 
appropriate procedures revolves around the goals of the index: whether it intends to reflect changes 
in  the “costs of producing” or changes in the “costs of living.” This paper focuses primarily on 
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The difficulty here concerns the fit of a framework to a differentiated-product 
industry; inevitably, some features of reality  are sacrificed to a model. This 
paper  modifies  a Bresnahan-Berry  model  of  vertical  quality differentiation, 
which  differentiates  products  along  only  one  dimension,  here,  computing 
power.* While simple, this specification captures much of the  difference in 
demand for systems with different computing capacities, that is, measurable 
changes in demand for systems with higher speed and more memory. The pa- 
per argues that changes in capacity provide information about the introduction 
of new capabilities and services. Thus, the model quantifies important exten- 
sions in product space over time and the contribution to surplus from these 
extensions. In addition, the model estimates the decline in the cost function of 
computer vendors over time, which serves a secondary goal, namely to esti- 
mate a fully specified model of the computing market in which changes to the 
costs of producing quality alters market outcomes. Finally, though the model 
predicts  intersystem  competitive  outcomes  with  only  limited  success,  it 
provides a rough measure of the importance of new-product entry for buyer's 
surplus. 
8.2  Technological Changes in Computing, 1968-1981 
This section briefly describes important features of technological change in 
the mainframe computing market from 1968 to 198  I. During this period the 
industry witnessed a rapid decline in prices, a dramatic extension of capabili- 
ties, and  a notable change  in the quality of  alternatives  to mainframes. For 
some buyers  the  economic  benefit  associated  with  technological  change  in 
mainframes was declines in prices, for others it was extensions of capabilities. 
Each is discussed in turn. 
Over the long run, mainframe products underwent a rapid decline in prices 
per measurable unit of computing, usually measured by central processing unit 
(CPU) speed and memory capacity. The important open debate concerns the 
association of dramatic change in price per computing unit with the introduc- 
tion of  particular products and other market events.'  For example, there is no 
2. All previous research investigates automobile-producer and -buyer behavior (Bresnahan 198  I, 
1987b; Feenstra and Levinsohn  1989; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1993). Previous use of these 
methods required a complete census of the price, quantity, and characteristics of every product in 
the market. The methods developed in this paper can be used when a complete census of product 
characteristics is not known, which suits data typically available to a computer-industry researcher. 
3. Construction of constant-quality price indexes has received much attention because of  its 
importance for gross national product (GNP) measurement. There is much disagreement about 
the proper methods to use and the proper data to employ to measure this phenomenon. See Gordon 
(1989, 1990); Dulberger (1989); Cole et al. (1986): Triplett (1986,  1989): Berndt and Griliches 
(1993): Berndt, Showalter, and Woolridge (1991): and Oliner (1993). Related research on  the 
welfare benefits from technical change uses similar price indexes to recover surplus generated 
from declines in the price of aggregate computing capital. Sometimes this approach also requires 
measurement of willingness to pay for new capabilities, which is often difficult to obtain (e.g., see 
Bresnahan 1987b: Flamm 1987a. 1987b; Brynolfsson 1993). 332  Shane M. Greenstein 
agreement about the improvement over previous  generations associated with 
the introduction of  the IBM system 370. This disagreement is important for 
any calculation of economic welfare because the system 370 replaced the sys- 
tem 360, and each was the most popular system in the United States in its day. 
Second, and more generally, the prices of old and new generations of systems, 
which may be substitutes, do not follow a simple pattern. Some observers ar- 
gue that “disequilibrium” influenced the pricing of mainframes, though there 
is much disagreement about its root causes (Fisher, McGowan, and Greenwood 
1983; Dulberger 1989; Gordon 1989). This debate influences the interpretation 
of the technical improvements embodied in new and old models. Both issues 
are discussed below. 
The industry also experienced extensions in capabilities in many  dimen- 
sions. Some improvements are reflected in the easily measurable features of a 
system, particularly those extensions associated with increases in computing 
capacity. Larger computing memory and faster CPU speeds permitted users to 
address increasingly complex  problems  and to perform  regularly  tasks that 
could not previously be attempted, let alone accomplished. Scientists and engi- 
neers were the first to take advantage of  faster computing speeds and larger 
memories. Internal  and external storage capacity also expanded, and  input/ 
output speeds increased. These innovations  made  large databases easier  to 
use  and  broadened  their  potential  applicability.  Hardware  architecture  and 
operating-system software underwent many refinements associated with multi- 
user  systems, a development crucial to all timesharing applications and ap- 
plications  that  require  many  users  to perform  quick  queries  of  centralized 
databases. Service bureaus, insurance and banking users, and many large or- 
ganizations employed  these developments in new  inventory  and reservation 
systems.  Later refinements  required  quick access to large databases in  real 
time. These applications were diffused widely  in the  1960s, and the refine- 
ments began to be diffused in the mid-1970s (Fisher, McGowan, and Green- 
wood 1983; Flamm 1987a, 1987b). 
Other extensions were also very important but are not so easily associated 
with  measurable  features  of  a  system.  Solid-state  circuitry,  improved  air- 
conditioning units, and more-compact designs also made systems more reli- 
able and lowered servicing costs, which resulted in the expansion of computing 
into ever more essential enterprise functions. New  and better  programming 
languages also diffused across many systems. By the end of the 1970s a third- 
party software industry had begun to mushroom, further diffusing refined ap- 
plication  software across many computing platforms. Other peripherals also 
improved, such as printers, terminals, and countless other minor components. 
The relevant point is that these innovations and many others were important to 
buyers but are not easy to measure. 
As the computer industry matured, users came to expect change-that  is, 
extensions of capabilities or entirely new products-and  plan for it. Buyers 
modified the memory and speed of their CPUs but kept other durable invest- 333  From Superminis to Supercomputers 
ments in software or peripherals. Or buyers enhanced particular software pro- 
grams or peripheral components, but not other parts of their systems. As buyers 
learned about their needs and discovered technological opportunities, as new 
products were introduced, and as old products became obsolete, buyers had 
to continually reevaluate their situations. A regular cycle began  to emerge: 
peripheral  and software upgrading  induced bottlenecks  in CPUs, which in- 
duced further CPU upgrading, which induced further peripheral and software 
enhancements. The introduction of  timesharing and techniques for querying 
central databases further accelerated these regular cycles. 
Three important points follow from this cycle: first, upgrading to a larger 
CPU capacity became associated with taking advantage of technical improve- 
ments in other parts of the system. Thus, the invention, and reduction in price, 
of large computing capacity enabled many users to take advantage of technical 
change in complementary components. For many buyers, demand for greater 
computing capacity reflected demand for complementary peripherals and soft- 
ware. Second, the extension of capabilities in peripheral components, software, 
and CPUs interacted with enhancements in other parts of the system. The eco- 
nomic value created by the extension of computing capacity, while obviously 
important, does not  relate  in  any  linear  fashion to the  decline in  prices  in 
constant-quality CPUs. Value creation must also relate to the prices and func- 
tions of other parts of the system. 
Third, the rate of value creation to a buyer could be much different than the 
rate of  price decline in computing capacity. It could be faster if  declines in 
prices enabled a user to realize local economies of scale in the distribution of 
computing services and in the employment of computing capital investments. 
Localized economies of scale could produce the repackaging problem in CPU 
product characteristics, that is, buyers valued the increase in computing capac- 
ity embodied in CPUs. Since researchers of centralized management of com- 
puting facilities (e.g., Inmon 1985; Fnedman and Cornford 1989) emphasize 
the replacement cycle, this factor was probably very important for many buy- 
ers. On the other hand, the rate of value creation to a buyer could be slower if 
the bottlenecks underlying the replacement cycle choked off the ability to real- 
ize much advance. Since researchers of centralized management of computing 
facilities also emphasize increasing buyer dissatisfaction with translating en- 
terprise needs into feasible technical solutions, particularly by the early 1980s, 
many buyers may not have realize localized economies of scale. 
Notable changes to nonmainframes partially  determined the relative value 
buyers placed on the changes to large systems. If  some buyers do not have 
a repackaging  problem,  declines  in prices may  simply induce purchases of 
cheaper computing power, but not necessarily purchases of bigger CPUs. That 
is, the choice between a large or a small CPU depends on the relative price per 
characteristic for small and large systems as each is introduced. This is im- 
portant because there were many changes in these choices over the period. Few 
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but over the 1970s minicomputer  hardware along with general-purpose  soft- 
ware was developed, so that users could perform  some small tasks that pre- 
viously required mainframes. These minicomputers were especially attractive 
for a decentralized  computing environment. By  198  1 minicomputer  vendors 
were also beginning to offer users viable growth paths for their systems if the 
users’ needs outgrew large  supermini^.^ In principle, buyers could (and many 
did) break up their computing needs into smaller units, taking advantage of 
decentralized management. Most importantly for empirical purposes, the costs 
and capabilities of smaller systems shifted over the period, and their purchase 
is outside the view provided by the data in this paper. 
This brief history suggests that it may not make sense to conceive of techno- 
logical change as equivalent to a simple fall in price levels. Price declines en- 
abled many events that took place. Yet, important episodes of value creation 
were associated with specific inventions that extended buyer capabilities into 
new areas-for  example, the invention of reliable real-time database querying 
or the invention of interruption-free multiuser computing. Value creation was 
not associated solely (or even primarily) with the decline in costs of the deliv- 
ery of these services. The willingness to take advantage of new capabilities in 
any period became associated with a willingness to adopt computing capacity 
of higher and higher levels. The importance of the willingness to pay for new 
capabilities will ultimately be an empirical issue. Is there evidence of much 
adoption of  systems with increases in capabilities? 
8.3  The Model 
A supply-side model and a demand-side model constitute this paper’s mea- 
surement framework. The model focuses attention on the demand for comput- 
ing capacity. The model is flexible enough to allow underlying demand prefer- 
ences to vary over difference capacities and sizes and to change over time. It 
also permits the costs of supplying computing capacity to decline over time. 
Finally, it provides a rough test of whether vendors compete solely in measur- 
able features of computing capacity. 
8.3.1  Demand-Side Considerations 
Consider a market in a given year. As in Bresnahan’s (1981, 1987a) model 
of  the automobile  market, this  study makes five assumptions:  (1) All users 
evaluate all mainframe computers in terms of the same (vertical) index of qual- 
ity, that is, computing power. (2) Users differ in their willingness to pay for 
computing power. (3) There are many “uses” for computer systems, each re- 
quiring one computer system. (4)  Each potential  user compares N  possible 
4. Note that personal computers (PCs) were only beginning to diffuse by  198 1 and were largely 
employed as sophisticated terminals. PCs were not viewed as substitutes for mainframes except 
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different models. The net benefit from each modelj  in use i is U,, = e,d, -  4. 
Here, e is the marginal utility of quality, which varies across users i, d is quality, 
and p  is the price  of  the product. (5) There is a composite good of  “lower” 
quality, which is not part of the focus product group but is a potential option 
for purchase by users. This will be good zero, the “outside good.” It sells for 
price Po and has quality do. In this study, the outside good is equivalent to a 
small IBM mainframe  or general-purpose  superminicomputer. Its price and 
quality change each year. 
Equilibrium in the market concerns the demand for computing power. The 
system chosen satisfies U, > U,L  for all j,  k # j.  Thus, an optimal choice im- 
plies  that e, > bJk  = (f‘,  - P,)/(d, - dk)  for all j, k  # j. In equilibrium, 
users will find that they can rank systems (see Bresnahan 198  1 for elaboration) 
according to their computing power. Allj  models are ranked according to d, or 
4;  either ranking  is equivalent in eq~ilibrium.~  Some systems will  provide 
considerable computing power but will be expensive, while others will provide 
little computing power but will be inexpensive. The data in this study appear 
consistent with this structural assumption for two reasons:  (1) a spread exists 
between the capabilities  (and prices)  of the least and most powerful  main- 
frames,  and  (2) most  measures  of  computing  performance  and  prices  are 
highly correlated. 
Let the willingness to pay for computing power, e,  ,  be distributed according 
to some function F(z).  This function represents the cumulative distribution of 
purchasers with a marginal utility of purchase less that z. Let S,  measure the 
market share of productj. Model j = N is the highest quality available, and b, 
measures a choice betweenj and j -  1. This implies b, = F-’[ 1 -  (C;V_,  Sk)], 
j = 1, . . . ,  N, where S, = Q,/M, Q, is the quantity sold of product j,  and 
M  is the  total  potential  size of  the number  of  uses. If  M  is a parameter  to 
be estimated and Q is data, then by  design 0 < Cy=lS,  5  1, so M > Cy=,Q,, 
since  the  outside  good  is not  observed.  That is, estimates  of  M, the  total 
size of the market, must exceed the total number of observed purchases.h As in 
Bresnahan  (1981,  1987a), this  paper  also  employs  a  uniform  distribution, 
b, = [ 1 -  (~~=,Sk)].  Thus, estimating the density is essentially the same as 
estimating M.7 This is illustrated in figure 8.1. The above implies a relationship 
5. In this model d, >  d,-, implies P, >  P,-,  for all observedj  systems, since a system violating 
this inequality would not be chosen at all. Thus, prices mnst rise faster than quality as quality 
improves. Increasing the marginal costs of quality can yield this outcome. See Bresnahan (1981, 
1987a) and Berry (1994) for further elaboration. 
6. Previous authors have  assumed that M  was known,  so estimating M  is  one novelty here 
(Berry 1994). 
7. Berry (1 994) suggests using distributions other than the uniform. With an exponential distri- 
butionwegetb, = -8 In[S, + exp(-b,+,/8)] = -8  In(X,;Y=,Sk),where8isthemeanofthe 
exponential distribution. This must be set equal to one, since it is not identified. Preliminary re- 
search also used an exponential distribution and found no change in the essential results, so this 
paper will only show results for the uniform distribution. For the price and quantity data used in 
this paper, estimates of implied quality with the two distributions were highly correlated in every 
year ofthis sample (around .9). 336  Shane M. Greenstein 
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Fig. 8.1  Determination of market share in a vertical model 
between market share and quality, that is, d, = d,-, + (4 -  f-  I )lb,,  j = 1, . . . , 
N.  To adapt to an incomplete data set (explained below), take the definition for 
b and substitute recursively to get 
The model has several noteworthy features. First, equivalent prices between 
models j  and j  + 1 imply equivalent qualities. Second, the value of d, -  do  is 
the net quality of a system compared with an outside good. Without a measure 
of the quality of  the outside good, it is only possible to directly compute an 
index of a system’s quality compared with an (unobserved) outside good. This 
makes for careful interpretation because the price and quality of  the outside 
good are changing over time. Third, computing d, -  do does not require any 
data on system characteristics, only data on prices and quantities. It is entirely 
a function of the total estimated users and the data about the prices and market 
shares. This will suit available data well, because there is acceptable informa- 
tion on prices and quantities but not on every system’s characteristics. 
8.3.2  Supply-side Considerations 
There are many optional  forms for  describing  supply-side behavior. The 
simplest is the case of independent pricing. This model assumes that the eco- 
nomic actor who prices a system only considers the effect of a system’s price 
on the profitability  of  that system and does not internalize the effect of  that 
system’s price on the profitability of any other system. Marginal revenue equals 337  From Superminis to Supercomputers 
where this expression takes advantage of the definition of b, in terms of prices 
and implied qualities.8 
The independent-pricing model easily generalizes to a conjectural-variation 
model (Bresnahan  1989), an approach widely used in empirical applications 
for testing behavioral  assumption^.^ The conjectural-variation parameter tests 
the assumption  of  Bertrand  pricing,  which  is roughly  equivalent to testing 
whether some unobserved  factor other than demand for computing capacity 
influences prices. Marginal revenue is 
(3)  MR, = 4 -  exp(6)QJ/M[(d, -  d,-,)-’  + (d,,,  -  d,)-‘l. 
It is easier to estimate exp( 6)  than v,  because it prevents accidental division by 
zero in a maximum-likelihood algorithm. Testing Bertrand behavior amounts 
to testing H:8  = 0. If  8 is large, then v is close to 1 and Bertrand pricing is 
rejected. The demand elasticity for systemj  is e& = -eg(P,Q,M)/exp(S)S,  . 
Notice that M  and exp(6) are the only estimated parameters in MR  and ek,, 
which means many factors influence the estimate of M.  This is important be- 
cause the bounds on the estimate of M,  M > cy=  ,Q, ,  limits the elasticity. Since 
exp(6) acts in inverse relation to M,  estimates of 8 may offset limits associated 
with estimating M. 
This model of vendor behavior has several obvious drawbacks. Independent 
pricing violates the spirit of multiproduct competition in the mainframe com- 
puter industry.’O Moreover, the above specification is not ideal for modeling 
the pricing of older systems, where the used market constrains pricing (Oliner 
1993). Finally, the above specifications do not treat vendors  asymmetrically, 
which violates industry folklore about IBM’s dominance. These are important 
issues for the estimation of vendor behavior, though not necessarily important 
for the estimation of buyer’s surplus, nor necessarily for quantifying extensions 
in product space. The discussion of  results will highlight the points at which 
these issues pertain to this study’s analysis. 
8.4  Estimation 
Berry (1994) compares the computed implied quality with measured quality 
and the implied marginal revenue with measured marginal cost, which is the 
strategy used here with modifications  to match available data. The measures 
of quality are the vector x, for product j.  Then 
(4)  d, -  do = exp(x,p  + Ed,),  and 
MR, = exp(x,cx  + ES,), 
8. Note that marginal revenue must be suitably adjusted when f, =  which is a rare event 
in this data. This paper  adopts the convention that both  systems compete against their nearest 
neighbors. Thus, the marginal benefit from changing a price is from cutting into that neighbor’s 
market share. 
9. See the discussion in Bresnahan (1987a) for more on this point. 
10. This experiment cannot employ Bresnahan’s (1981) approach to this issue because in this 
paper’s data it is very uncommon for the same firm to market two “neighboring” products. 338  Shane M. Greenstein 
where Ed, and ES, are error terms. The multiplicative form for the quality index 
is for convenience. The multiplicative form for marginal cost, following previ- 
ous research (e.g., Bresnahan  1981, 1987a), assumes that marginal costs are 
convex in characteristics. It also guarantees positive estimated marginal costs. 
It is necessary to instrument for x,  since the cost of designing systems with x, 
characteristics  determines  the observed characteristics  and their prices (and 
quantities and implied quality), leading to simultaneous-equations  bias. 
Note that d, is an implicit function of M and Po. This analysis assumes M is 
unknown  and Po is known,  with one exception described  be1ow.l’  Let M = 
TQ(  1 + r),  where TQ = C,N_lQ,  is the total number of observed purchases. 
This analysis assumes rl = r,+l  for all t, but otherwise there will be separate 
supply and demand equations for each year in the initial estimates.’z As de- 
scribed below, the data are arranged to determine Po in each year. This benefits 
the simulations later and does not significantly change estimation results.” 
When M  and the other parameters  are not known, they can be estimated 
using nonlinear three-stage least squares (Amemiya 1985). Minimize 
where  E  = Y -  (X’PX)-’X’PY,  P-  = Z(Z’Z)-lZ,  Y’ = (d’,  MR‘),  dand 
MR are vectors of the left-handkde‘variables, x is the matrix of regressors, X 
is a block diagonal matrix of regressors x, z is a matrix of the set of instruments 
for x, and Z is a block diagonal matrix of instruments z. The choice of x  and z 
will be discussed below. Note, however, that this system can be estimated since 
there exists a complete set of data on prices and quantities. There is no need 
for x variables for every system’s characteristics. The (T term is a two-by-two 
matrix of consistent estimates for the variance and covariance of E. These esti- 
mates are found from the nonlinear two-stage least squares errors and are equal 
to u = C(  &’&)IT,  where T is the number of  observations.  Minimizing  the 
above equation yields estimates for a,  p, and M,  which then yelds estimates of 
d, -  do and e1a~ticities.I~ 
There is a subtle tradeoff between guaranteeing positive estimates of mar- 
l l. If  M  is known, then it is easy to estimate the independent-pricing  model. Po  can  be  left 
unidentified within a constant term. Thus, one can estimate In(d, -  d,, -  x,p = ~d,  and In(MR,) 
-  x,ct  = ES, using a standard minimum-distance estimator. 
12. Other parameterizations of the size of the market did not produce qualitatively different 
results, so this paper only presents the simplest specification. 
13. Without further economic modeling of the outside good and its quality, do,  the structural 
form for P,  will necessarily be ad hoc. Bresnahan (1981, 1987a) deals with this issue by  positing 
a hedonic relationship between the quality of  the outside good and its price. 
14. In practice, minimizing f can be very time consuming. Effort is saved by  recognizing that 
the optimized estimated p and ct will be  [ct,p]’ = [X’(uOP;)X]~’[X’(uOP,)Y].  Setting p 
and ct equal to optimized values and substituting into f yields a concentrated function determined 
solely by the value of M and market-power parameters. It is then straightforward to find the opti- 
mal  ct and p (as functions of the optimal d and MR).  The final step is to find the standard errors 
for all the estimates by  computing  the variance-covariance matrix  with  all  the (already  opti- 
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ginal costs and guaranteeing plausible elasticity estimates for every product. If 
marginal costs are positive by design, marginal revenue may be negative for a 
few observations where parameter estimates are “far away” from their respec- 
tive  optimums.  This  is  problematic  because  it  destroys  any  maximum- 
likelihood algorithm (i.e., ln[MR] does not exist for MR <  0). The more gen- 
eral point is that the functional form cannot guarantee that all product elastici- 
ties are less than -  1 at nonoptimized parameters. This is related, since MR, = 
The approximation In[ q(  1  + 1 /el)  ] =  In( q)  + 1 /el eliminates both prob- 
lems and results in positive marginal costs everywhere. This works well with 
this paper’s data because  1  /e,  is much less than -  1 for all but a few observa- 
tions in the final estimates. The alternative  solution  to the above problems, 
which is not presented,  is to not guarantee that marginal  costs are positive. 
This alternative lets elasticities  attain both plausible  and implausible  values 
without  stopping the whole estimation,  but it sometimes results in negative 
predicted  marginal  costs.  Since a few implausible  elasticities  are inevitable 
under either specification, at least the approximation above guarantees positive 
marginal costs. As it turned out, all but a few elasticities were much smaller 
than -  1 at optimized parameters, so the cost of using the approximation was 
small.  l5 
+ l/e,)I. 
8.5  Surplus Measurement 
The total buyer’s surplus net of the outside good is 
N 
C[(b,  + b,+i)(d, -  d,)/2 -  (4 -  po)lQ,. 
,=I 
(6) 
Since d, is not identified, d, alone cannot be identified. The d, -  d, can come 
from two possible sources. If there is characteristic  data for all systems, then 
it is possible to use the estimate of  p and x,.  Since this paper does not have 
data for all systems, d, -  do  come directly from the estimate of M and from 
the data on prices and quantities. 
This method does not measure the benefits from buying a system in terms 
of its characteristics. Nor does it measure the average benefits from buying a 
system, or the total benefits  to buyers from computerization.  There are two 
reasons for this. First, this model of each year’s competition presumes to mea- 
sure the benefits associated with the last bit of computing power purchased, 
not the surplus  associated  with buying  the first fractional  unit of  computer 
15. One other alternative is to use an error structure like the one found in Bresnahan (1981, 
1987a).  He solves for the optimal price and quantity under the assumption that the model is correct 
and compares those computed numbers against the actual observed data. Bresnahan’s alternative 
requires a complete data set, i.e., characteristics for all models. While this exists for new automo- 
biles, such data do not exist for the historical computer market, rendering this alternative infea- 
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power. Second, the method does not anchor the estimates of the quality of a 
system over time. That is, the absolute level of quality of a particular model is 
not constrained to be similar over time. Thus, surplus estimates may change 
over time due to changing units of comparison. In particular, the outside good 
changes each year, altering  the relative benefits  of  being  in the mainframe 
market. 
These limitations make the method well suited to two unit-free estimates of 
the importance of new entry. One is to estimate the percentage of surplus in a 
given year attributable to systems with certain features, such as young age or 
large computing power. The main advantage of this measure is that the percent- 
age of surplus is unit-free and easily compared over time. If extension of capa- 
bilities matters in this market, then it must at least hold in the single capability 
extended here, computing power. If the percentage of surplus associated with 
large systems falls over time, then we reject the view that this factor matters. 
A second experiment involves removing systems with particular characteris- 
tics and comparing  surplus generated  with and without  those systems. This 
comparison  is in the spirit of  welfare calculations that hold population  and 
demand characteristics constant but change the choice set available to consum- 
ers. As before, the percentage difference in surplus is unit-free and easily com- 
pared over time. If buyers adopt new systems because they embody unobserv- 
able, but valuable, extensions of capabilities, then removing new systems could 
result in large losses in surplus. 
8.6  The Data 
This paper’s data on computer prices, quantities,  and vintages come from 
industry  censuses  from International  Data  Corporation’s (IDC’s) Electronic 
Data Processing Industry Reports (EDP/IR).I6 IDC estimated the number of 
installations of each type of computer system and, until  1981, estimated the 
monthly rental at which an average type of system 1eased.I’ The data in this 
paper begin  with the 31 December 1968 report and end with the  1 January 
1981 report. The first year in which IDC distinguished between the number of 
installations  inside and outside the United  States was  1968. Over the entire 
fourteen-year period, these data concern the installed base of over 350 different 
16. Patrick McGovern began compiling this census in 1962 in Computers and Auromation mag- 
azine. It continued in modified form under IDC auspices from the mid-1960s onward. The archives 
of the Charles Babbage Institute at the University of Minnesota contains a collection. This paper 
also makes use of a set of EDP Industry Reports contained at the Library for the Graduate School 
of Business at Stanford University. 
17. Phister identifies several years in which IDC revised the reported number of installations in 
previous years, particularly for IBM models in 1967-72.  In those cases, Phister’s reported updates 
were used.  This  makes  this paper’s  estimates  comparable  with  Phister’s  (1979) and  Flamm’s 
(1987a, 1987b)  descriptions of the diffusion of computing equipment, which used more-aggregate 
IDC data. It also makes this paper’s results comparable to Oliner’s (1993) analysis of the retirement 
patterns among IBM mainframes, which uses similar IDC data for IBM systems. 341  From Superminis to Supercomputers 
computer systems (see the appendix of Greenstein  1994). These are clearly 
the best data available on the size of installed base and rental prices.’* 
8.6.1  The Sample 
Without modification, two biases arise from maintaining exclusive use of 
IDC’s definition of a mainframe. First, the 1968-69  definition of a mainframe 
is too broad. It includes some systems that IDC reclassified as “digital dedi- 
cated applications” in  1970. These systems are actually minicomputers, like 
the Digital Equipment Corporation’s (DEC’s) PDP-8, not general-purpose sys- 
tems. Second, more redefinition problems arise on a smaller scale because IDC 
established several on going databases for systems other than mainframes (i.e., 
minicomputers, small business systems, desktop systems). Its researchers oc- 
casionally move a system into the mainframe category that was not previously 
there. Its researchers also move a system out of the mainframe category that 
previously was there.I9 
The best  solution  to this problem  defines the  outside good  consistently 
across different years of the sample. This paper’s outside good is the smallest 
mainframe offered by IBM, a system 360/20 (introduced in September 1965). 
The system 360/20 has the virtue that it is very close to the smallest mainframe 
in IDC’s census, but it provides a more consistent definition of the lower bound 
on this market over time than that used by IDC. Moreover, its price changes 
throughout the sample period, reflecting real changes in the quality and market 
price of systems that performed small decentralized computing tasks. Finally, 
it eliminates only a few useful potential observations in each year.2n  Table 8.  I 
shows the results of this selection. Consistently defining the outside good does 
not impose a large loss. The systems used by more than twenty thousand buy- 
ers typically are sampled. The greatest losses occur in the most recent years, 
when  this  procedure  eliminates  12 of  the  178 potential  observations  from 
IDC’s census. 
Even with a consistently defined outside good, two potential problems re- 
main. First, IDC revised its survey scope twice, once between 1969 and 1970, 
and once between 1976 and 1977. In both cases, IDC consolidated the number 
of models it covered.*’ Second, by the end of  the sample, the difference be- 
tween  mainframes  and  some  large  general-purpose  minicomputers  (“su- 
18. No other comparable data source exists for this period. Remarkably, only a few studies of 
the computing market (e.g.,  Michaels 1979; Phister 1979; Flamm 1987a, 1987b; Dulberger 1989; 
Oliner 1993; Khanna 1994) have used parts of this data and none has ever exploited all facets of 
it (e.g., see Greenstein 1994 for an examination of diffusion). 
19. The most important case is IDC’s decision to include the IBM system 36 in the sample in 
1976 (estimated installed base at five thousand units) and exclude it from mainframes after that 
(but include it in “small business systems”). Early experiments showed that this particular flip- 
flop makes 1976 estimates inconsistent with those of other years. 
20. Part of the reason is that there are fewer characteristics data available for the small systems. 
In addition, the vast majority of eliminated systems were commercial failures. 
21. For example, the number of models covered in 1969 was 176, while only 147 were covered 
in  1970. In  1976 there were 205 models covered, but only 188 in 1977. See table 8.1. 342  Shane M. Greenstein 
Table 8.1  Matching Industry Data with Characteristics Data 
Models with 
Characteristics Data 
Sample of  Original 
Installed  Number of  Included in 







































































perminis”) becomes blurred, which raises questions about the survey’s com- 
pleteness. The main issue is whether IDC included in the mainframe category 
all  the superminicomputer systems  that  were close  substitutes  for general- 
purpose mainframes. A reasonable case could be made that IDC included most 
relevant systems,22  but a reasonable case could also be made that it did not.*’ 
Ending the sample in 1981 holds this problem to a minimum. 
8.6.2  Definition of Market Share and Price 
The paper uses the installed base of systems in a given year as a measure of 
quantity and market share. This is justified because most buyers leased their 
22. It is not clear whether the money spent on superminis ever amounted to more than a small 
fraction of  the amount of  money  spent on mainframes. According to the  1983 IDC census for 
minicomputers and mainframes, the value of  installed base associated with superminicomputers 
came to roughly  half  the value of  all minicomputers, or roughly 15 percent of  the value of  the 
installed base of  mainframes. IDC’s census differs from the other censuses, particularly  that of 
the Computer Business Equipment Manufacturing Association  (CBEMA), because IDC includes 
several systems as mainframes (i.e., those from IBM) which others classify as superminicomput- 
ers. This makes IDC’s census more “complete,” which matters by the early  1980s. For example, 
according to CBEMA (1992), in  1976 mainframe shipments reached over S5 billion,  while the 
total  spent on all minicomputers was $1.8 billion.  By  1982, CBEMA estimates that mainframe 
shipments reached $10.6 billion and minicomputer shipments reached $7.7 billion. CBEMA does 
not state what fraction went to superminicomputers, but $7.7 billion clearly overstates the size of 
the competition between mainframe and minicomputers. 
23. The most questionable omissions in IDCS mainframe tables are those regarding the VAX 
models from DEC, and similar competitive models from other firms such as Wang, Prime, and 
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equipment in the late 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, many mainframe computers 
are not subject to frequent mechanical breakdowns,  so the services delivered 
do not physically depreciate rapidly after sale, if at all (though market value 
may depreciate due to technological obsolescence). The drawback is that this 
definition overstates the popularity of an old system (and the general competi- 
tiveness of the market) by showing that old and new  systems are in compe- 
tition. 
While Phister (1979) clearly believes that IDC’s estimates of installed base 
are the best among the available alternatives, he nevertheless warns about sev- 
eral potential  problems that  could  influence calculations  using these  data.24 
Dulberger (1989) also questions the accuracy of IDC’s estimates of installed 
base, while conceding that they are the best publicly available.25  Given these 
concerns, the data were  tested  for internal  consistency, which  they  readily 
met.2h  In any event, no alternative is satisfactory. Sales data are not available, 
and it is not possible to estimate sales from the change in installed base from 
year to year, because it becomes an increasingly poor estimate of shipments of 
systems when systems become more than a few years old. 
IDC estimated the price of a typical system configuration, which is the price 
used in this study. IDC’s estimates are probably of the right order of magnitude, 
but they are also subject to measurement error. Phister uses these prices for 
estimates of the value of installed base. However, he believes that the prices 
for obsolete systems are too high, since IDC would use the last offered price 
for a system lacking any recent transaction, but that the bias in old prices in- 
fluences  only  a  few of  the  systems  in  the  United  States.  Flamm (1987b) 
reaches a similar conclusion before using Phister’s estimates for a few calcula- 
tion~.~~  Thus, no strong conclusions should rely exclusively on one price. 
8.6.3  System Characteristics 
The characteristics that make up x, partially overlap those used in Gordon’s 
(1989, 1990), Dulberger’s (1989), and Oliner’s (1993) analyses of computer- 
system hedonic regressions (see Triplett  1989 for a complete summary of the 
relevant issues). MIPS, or millions of instructions per second, is an estimate 
24. He states, “It is my opinion that IDC’s staff, files, and data sources make that organization’s 
published statistics the best available” (250). Yet, due to occasional revisions of previous EDP/IR 
reports, Phister is not convinced that IDC’s  estimates of  the size Gf installed base are precise. 
However, many of his uses of these data reveal his belief that IDC got the order of magnitude 
correct. Where available, this paper uses Phister’s corrections. 
25. One especially difficult problem is that IDC may underestimate the number of users who 
upgrade their systems (Dulberger, personal communication, July 1991  ). 
26. The history of each new system was examined. Did the development of  its installec‘ base 
follow a reasonable pattern of growth, i.e., several years of growth followed by  several years of 
decline? The absence of such a pattern would have called into question the plausibility of the data. 
27. In addition, using these prices is not without precedent in the hedonic literature. The prices 
for new systems used by Gordon (1989, 1990), as well as by many others, are very similar to those 
used here. Gordon’s prices for his sample after 1977 were taken from Computerworld, which is 
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of speed. The maximum memory in megabytes (MB) included in a system is 
an estimate of memory size.** 
MIPS and memory-size data are not available for every system in every year. 
Computer Intelligence Corporation (CIC) provides information about the fea- 
tures of systems extant in 1991 and other important historical  CIC’s 
characteristics data cover roughly three-quarters of the most important main- 
frame and superminicomputer systems (used primarily  in business  applica- 
tions) in 198  1, or more than 90  percent of the installed base, which makes it more 
comprehensive than any other single data source. Table 8.1 shows that CIC 
characteristics data match an increasing fraction of the total number of models 
IDC surveyed. The sample size begins at 59  for 1968 and grows to 178 by 198  1. 
IDC provides a measure of  the technical generation of a system. Dulberger 
(1989) warns that hedonic techniques may be mismeasuring the factors decid- 
ing prices when the data are taken from a cross section of systems in a market 
undergoing rapid technological  “leap frogging” by  successive new systems. 
Dulberger argues that this “disequilibrium” requires an explicit treatment in a 
hedonic framework. The simplest means of  testing Dulberger’s argument, as 
found in Bemdt and Griliches (1993) and Oliner (1993), is to measure the time 
that has elapsed since the introduction of  a system. This variable is labeled 
“techage.” Systems that had more experience in the marketplace should have 
more  software  and  other complementary  system  enhancements, which  in- 
creased the system’s quality for the user. 
IDC’s censuses categorize every system by size, with size ranging from two 
to seven. This measure is of  limited usefulness for a regressor because it is 
categorical, not continuous, and is highly correlated with MIPS and memory. 
However, it will be useful for the simulations, because it is available for all 
systems, and therefore it provides a means for testing important differences 
between  entry behavior on the highest  and  lowest ends of  the computing- 
power spectrum. 
Instruments (the z matrix) for each system are all of the characteristics data 
from the nearest lower and higher neighboring  systems (for which there is 
characteristics data).  These characteristics are typically exogenous, since they 
are designed by another firm. Yet they are also correlated with the characteris- 
tics of the neighboring system, so they make good instruments.30 
28. Because minimum and maximum memory are highly correlated (between .6 and .7 in a 
year), only one could be used. Because there are many reasons to think that maximum memory is 
more relevant to buyers than minimum (Bresnahan and Greenstein  1992), maximum memory is 
used throughout the estimation. 
29. The measures of these variables come from CIC’s 1991 Computer System Report, which 
has many virtues relative to the alternatives. The Computerworld data, which Professor Gordon 
kindly lent, begin in 1977. They cover too few systems up to  1981 to be useful. The Auerbach 
data, which Professor Michaels lent, cover the early part of the  1970s. Unfortunately, they also 
only cover a small number of years. While the Phister (1979) data cover a longer period, they 
generally only record the system characteristics for the most popular systems and not for the whole 
market. In fact, Phister’s data cover only about 20-30  percent of the system models surveyed by 
IDC. CIC’s data cover the same systems, plus many more. 
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Table 8.2 shows how the typical system in the sample changes over time. 
The average price of a system (deflated by a producer price index) and the 
average size of a system’s installations  included in the sample decline over 
most of  the years of the sample. The typical  system contains more memory 
(from 1,099 or 5,592 MB maximum memory on average) and performs more 
instructions per second (from 0.326 to 2.22). These statistics about MIPS and 
memory suggest that the product space was extended over the sample period, 
but they are insufficient for conclusions about the economic importance of the 
extension. The most dramatic changes in the average occur in the last three 
years of the sample upon the entry of some large supercomputers. Despite the 
addition of new systems to the sample, the average technical age grows (from 
4.1 to 9.0); the inclusion of some very old systems in the sample of later years 
is to blame for this increase in the average. 
Figure 8.2 provides an illustration of the diffusion of large systems and fore- 
shadows results from the estimation. The figure shows a box plot of the distri- 
bution of MIPS in the computer systems used in each year.3’  The dark areas 
indicate the range between the first and third quartiles, while the white line 
shows the median. Every line above it represents a particular system until the 
maximum. While this is a coarse measure of  computing capacity, the figure 
shows a gradual extension of the product space. It also shows a gradual buyer 
adoption of those extensions and a gradual shifting of revenues to systems with 
higher computing capacity. For example, the MIPS of the 95th percentile of 
1968 is the median of  the MIPS of  systems in use by  1981. In addition, the 
product space between the maximum and the 95th percentile becomes progres- 
sively filled in over time with new products, even as these points vary. Yet many 
years must pass before the extensions of  product  space are widely adopted. 
The 95th percentile stays roughly the same between  1968 and  1973 and be- 
tween  1974 and 1976, and it only begins to grow after 1977. 
8.7  Results 
This section presents estimates of the model and various tests of those esti- 
mates. The discussion also presents calculations of buyer’s surplus and the rate 
of decline in the cost function. These estimates and calculations quantify the 
dramatic changes in the computer industry that took place over this period. 
8.7.1  The Estimates 
Table 8.3 presents estimates of the conjectural-variation model. With a few 
exceptions, most of the estimates of  ci  and p are of the predicted sign and are 
significant. Systems with more computing power possess higher quality and 
31. The figure shows only the MIPS ratings for the systems that were used in the estimation. 
While this is an incomplete sample of the systems in use, the coverage tends to be almost complete 
for the largest systems and the most popular systems. Hence, this provides a pretty accurate reflec- 
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0.0074  0.3844 
0.0097  0.6434 
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0.0128  0.58 I5 
0.0109  0.5 103 
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Table 8.2  (continued) 
Standard 
Year  Mean  Deviation  Variance  Minimum  Maximum  Sample Size 
1968  362.3019 
1969  357.8333 
1970  394.2656 
1971  283.7015 
1972  284.5325 
1973  244.7841 
1974  231.8021 
1975  231.1980 
1976  209.4956 
1977  192.0984 
1978  184.7353 
1979  183.0507 
1980  159.5032 
1981  169.3735 
1968  4.0758 
1969  4.6989 
1970  5.1931 
1971  5.4792 
1972  5.3781 
1973  5.8166 
1974  6.5785 
1975  7.2281 
1976  7.1648 
1977  7.8173 
1978  8.2595 
1979  8.6930 
1980  8.8090 
1981  8.9833 





























765,373.6763  2.0000 
848,016.8531  1.0000 
1.263,8 13.9442  3.0000 
825,869.2429  1.0000 
637,067.0154  1.0000 
363,650.1482  1.0000 
239,467.7604  1.0000 
235,891.2604  2.0000 
209,549.4129  2.0000 
159,217.8580  1.0000 
125,320.1516  1.0000 
124,298.8368  1.0000 
94,172.1477  1.0000 
152,965.3991  1.0000 
Technical Age (years) 
3.7686  0.3340 
4.8262  1  .OOOO 
6.4426  0.9170 
8.7765  0.2500 
10.8823  0.8340 
11.6161  0.4170 
13.7573  1.1670 
14.6060  1.1670 
17.9084  1.3340 
18.2525  1.1670 
21.8868  1.1670 
25.6615  1.0840 
29.2483  1.0840 

























































have higher marginal cost. More memory contributes to the perceived quality 
of a product and to its increasing cost in all but the 1968 sample. Faster systems 
have higher quality and higher marginal costs in all of the estimates except the 
1972, 1973, and 1980 samples, when the coefficients are not significant. Older 
systems usually possess higher quality and have higher marginal cost, but the 
coefficient is insignificant half the time on the supply side. Estimates for the 
size of  the potential market are small, at 1 percent. For inapparent reasons, 
the model appears to fit badly in  1968, 1974, and 1980. 
The  variables  measuring  computing power  are  often  quantitatively  im- 
portant on both the demand and the supply sides. These results are consistent 
with the basic assumption of this model, that computing power alone explains 
most of the cross-sectional variation in demand for computing. The varying 348  Shane M. Creenstein 
I  I 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981 
Year 
Fig. 8.2  Distribution of MIPS in use, 1968-1981 
size of the technical-age variable does not support the view that disequilibrium 
pricing matters much for the model and data, which is also consistent with the 
methodological approach of this paper. 
A curiosity of these first estimates is that coefficients on the supply side do 
not seem to show a large reduction in the costs of  supplying characteristics 
over time. At most, there is a small (and erratic) downward shift in the costs 
of characteristics. This seems at odds with well-known declines in the costs of 
memory and processors. Later estimates showed that this pattern was an arti- 
fact of too much econometric freedom. A more constrained cost-function spec- 
ification, more typical of the literature, will measure some anticipated decline 
below. 
One other feature of these estimates has to do with the model’s economet- 
rics. The estimate of the implied quality of a system in one year has almost no 
econometric relationship to that estimate in another year. The model in each 
year requires that systems “price discriminate” between  users with different 
willingness to pay for computing power, but it does not require similar quality 
estimates for a given system from year to year. Thus, nothing inherently ties 
down the estimates of the implied quality of  a system from year to year and 
the estimates of  surplus generated  from those estimates  of  implied  quality. 
Given this econometric freedom, it is remarkable that the coefficient estimates 
do tend to have the same sign and roughly the same order of magnitude from Table 8.3  Parameter Estimates: Conjectural-Variation  Model 

























































-0.59  -4.13* 
1.21  0.37* 
-0.94  0.18* 
-0.39  0.21* 
Supply 
-0.56  -6.73* 
3.36  0.59* 
-2.90  0.33* 

























-2.66*  -2.14*  -6.14* 
0.12*  0.07*  0.30 
0.28*  0.18*  -0.20 
0.02  -0.03  0.32 
-4.26*  -3.90*  -9.02 
0.27*  0.15*  0.46 
0.49*  0.38*  -0.32 









*Significant at the 5 percent level. 350  Shane M. Greenstein 
year to year and roughly make sense. At the same time, the demand parameters 
are not close to constant across all years. These changes support the view that 
there are frequent changes to the basic relationship between the underlying 
valuation  of  computing  capacity and the  measurable features of computing 
capacity. 
8.7.2  Testing the Model 
The null hypothesis is that the conjecture parameter is zero, which is re- 
jected. The value of  the conjectural parameter rejects Bertrand pricing. The 
benefit  to  undercutting  rivals  is  small,  that  is,  price  increases  are  closely 
matched. All specifications and experiments with this data, many not shown 
here, could not eliminate this result. 
There are two fundamental reasons for this estimate. First, many products 
are priced close together, especially at the low end where many older systems 
are found.32  The model must interpret these systems as close substitutes, espe- 
cially when each system has such low market share. While this is probably the 
right inference for most systems with small market share, it underemphasizes 
the importance of systems that have significantly higher market share. Second, 
there is not enough flexibility in the marginal revenue equation to adapt to the 
wide dispersion of  market shares in this data. The only free parameter is M, 
but M  is constrained to be greater than the number of  systems sold. While 
the model does attribute less-competitive elasticities to the high-market  share 
systems, it may scale all the elasticity estimates incorrectly. M  would have to 
become  much  smaller to generate  elasticity  estimates  that  are  sensible for 
the high-market  share systems. The conjectural-variation parameter provides 
more  flexibility  because  it  rescales  the  elasticities  while  retaining  more- 
inelastic elasticities for systems with higher market share. Systems with large 
market share display elasticities consistent with large differences between mar- 
ginal cost and price and high markups over marginal 
This result suggests one of two things: First, if the model correctly describes 
product differentiation, then the firms behave quite differently from Bertrand 
pricing (Le., they are much less aggressive). Second, using a hypothesis that is 
more plausible, the parameter may show that some factors outside the model- 
that  is,  factors  other  than  the  pricing  and  product  differentiation  modeled 
here-largely  decide competition between vendors. This is plausible if  ven- 
dors are competing by embodying unmeasured new features in each generation 
of  their products.  This possibility  raises  the  same fundamental  issues with 
32. The difference between neighboring systems averages around 3 percent of  the price of the 
lower-priced system, but grows for the higher-priced systems. 
33. Only a subset of the total number of  systems available displays high markups over cost, 
which seems plausible. Inspection of  the data reveals that these systems are almost always the 
systems with large market share and they almost always come from IBM. There is also a slight 
tendency for more-expensive systems to have larger markups in absolute value, but smaller mark- 
ups as a percentage of price. This is because these systems are not as closely priced (in absolute 
value terms) to their neighbors as the lower-priced systems and they also have lower market share. 351  From Superminis to Supercomputers 
Table 8.4  Estimated Surplus (millions of 1982 $) 
Net Surplus 
Net Expenditure  per Dollar  Total 
Net Surplus  Less Outside  Total Installed  of Net  Net 





















































































Notes: Net surplus measures the surplus generated net of the outside good. Net expenditure less 
outside good represents the expenditures on systems in the sample (CP,Q,) less the expenditure 
on the outside good ( EPoQ,). 
which this paper began-that  is, about the proper means for modeling product 
differentiation and behavior in this industry. 
8.7.3  Buyer’s Surplus 
Table 8.4 summarizes the simulation of the consumer’s surplus for each year 
for the conjectural-variation model. The estimates of net total surplus are large, 
roughly one to two billion dollars a month (these are net of the potential bene- 
fits of purchasing the outside good).34  However, the estimates are also erratic, 
moving around by more than 50 percent from one period to the next. The aver- 
age surplus per system, which controls for the changes in the number of sys- 
tems in use in a year, makes more sense. These estimates also fluctuate, but 
less so than those that estimate the amount of  total surplus. These estimates 
show an irregular but steady decline in the consumer’s surplus per system after 
1971. Table 8.4 also shows the net total surplus per net dollar of expenditure 
(net of potential expenditure on the outside good). This too shows a slow but 
steady decline after 197  1. 
There are several possible explanations for the decline in net surplus per 
system and net  surplus per dollar. First, the model may increasingly fail to 
properly explain buyer exit from the mainframe market in the late 1970s. The 
availability  of  superminicomputers,  which  show up as devalued mainframe 
34. Strictly speaking, this restriction makes these estimates of surplus incomparable with previ- 
ous surplus estimates in this market (e.g., Bresnahan 3987b; Flamm 1987b; Brynjolfsson 1993). 352  Shane M. Greenstein 
computers in this model, could lie behind the trend. This solution is possible, 
but only partially successful. The rise in the net expenditure after 1977 is due 
to a large  discrete  change in  the  nominal  price  of  the outside  good  (from 
$3,675 to $2,800) and to inflation in the late 1970s, which produces the decline 
in the surplus per expenditure after 1977. Yet no such simple explanation can 
account  for trends between  1971 and  1976. The increase  in  the number  of 
systems, which can explain the decline in net surplus per system, did not cause 
a corresponding increase in the total net surplus. The lack of increase in net 
surplus is still the mystery. 
A second possibility, the most plausiblc one, is that the reduction of product 
differentiation to one dimension oversimplifies substitution possibilities. The 
model implausibly shows a crowded product space as new systems enter, as if 
all new entry occurs on intensive margins. In practice, many new systems may 
enter on extensive margins that this model cannot measure. This new entry 
generates  gains in true, yet  unmeasured, consumer’s  surplus. Therefore, the 
estimate in table 8.4 is too low, particularly in later years as systems get many 
new capabilities.  This explanation  suggest that,  at best, these estimates can 
only do a good job of estimating  surplus generated  at the extensive margin 
(more computing capacity). 
8.7.4  Importance of Entry on Extensive Margins 
Table 8.5 displays estimates of entry on the only extensive margin in this 
model, more computing capacity. The table shows the amount of surplus attrib- 
Table 8.5  Percentage of Surplus Associated with Different Vintages and Sizes 
Techage 5  Techage 5  Medium  Large  Very Large 
4 Years Old  6 Years Old  (size 5)  (size 6)  (size 7) 
Year  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B 
1968  .48  .37  .70  .62  .I3  .06  .07  .03  .01  .01 
1969  .08  .I  1  .73  .63  .I5  .08  .08  .03  .02  .01 
1970  .I0  ,14  .82  .7  1  .16  .08  .09  .04  .03  .01 
1971  .06  .I0  .I6  .22  .I9  .I0  .I1  .05  .03  .01 
1972  .15  .I5  .25  .29  .20  .  I I  .  I5  .07  .04  .02 
1973  .29  .24  .36  .36  .23  .I2  .I7  .08  .05  .02 
1974  .44  .32  .49  .4  1  .24  .I3  .2  1  .09  .06  .02 
1975  .27  .30  .53  .48  .25  .I3  .I9  .08  .06  .02 
1976  .20  .29  ,523  .53  .24  .I3  .20  .08  .07  .02 
1977  .I0  .24  .44  .52  .2  1  .I2  .20  .09  .08  .03 
1978  .I4  .23  .41  .50  .22  .13  .20  .09  .09  .03 
1979  .23  .28  .35  .46  .22  .I4  .21  .I0  .I  1  .04 
1980  .23  .I5  .38  .34  .I9  .  I1  .25  .I0  .I4  .04 
198  1  .3  1  .27  .49  .47  .I7  .I0  .23  .I0  .I4  .05 
Nores: A: Surplus associated with types of  systems as a percentage of total surplus. B: Percentage 
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utable to systems in IDC’s size-five, -six, and -seven categories, the top three 
categories in its ordinal ranking of system size. The percentage of surplus at- 
tributable to systems with high capacities grows over time. Roughly 21 percent 
of total surplus in 1968 is attributable to systems of sizes five, six, and seven, 
and only 8 percent to systems of sizes six and seven. This grows to as much as 
54 percent for all, and 23 and 14 percent for sizes six and seven, respectively, 
in  1981. Much of  the growth  in size six comes before  1976, while growth 
occurs almost every year for size-seven systems. This reflects a general trend 
and is not an artifact of any arbitrary data definition of size by IDC.35 
The table highlights two other factors about growth on the extensive margin. 
First, the fraction  of  the  installed base of  systems  attributable  to the high- 
capacity systems is small, never amounting to more than 10 percent of the total 
number of systems in 1968 and 25 percent in 1981. Yet this small fraction of 
systems accounts for a disproportionate  amount of  consumer’s  surplus-21 
percent  in  1968 and 54 percent in  1981. Part of  this occurs because larger 
systems cost the customer more. Even though  there are fewer of  them,  the 
expenditure per system is greater. Extending the product space a bit results in 
a huge increase of expenditure, though not nearly  as many  new units. This 
estimate supports the argument that growth on the extensive margin may have 
large influences on buyer’s surplus. 
However,  the  same estimates  quantify  a  new  aspect to extensive  margin 
growth. Note how long it took for this market to register much growth on the 
extensive margin.  Surplus in size seven undergoes  steady but  slow growth. 
Surplus in size six grows rapidly in the first half of the sample and slowly, but 
unevenly, in the second half. A close examination of the data illustrates why. 
The most popular size-six system, IBM 360/65, was first installed in late 1965. 
By 1968 users had installed over three hundred 360/65 models and over five 
hundred other more expensive systems. The IBM 370/ 155 then supplanted the 
360/65 as the most popular system of size six in the early 1970s, but the diffu- 
sion took several years to reach its peak. By the late 1970s, however, no single 
system dominated the large-system-size  category any longer. There was only 
gradual change on the extensive margin in the mid- to late  1970s as new sys- 
tems only  slowly  became widely  used. The slow but  steady entry of  many 
different new systems accounts for most of the growth in the late 1970s. 
Table 8.5 also presents estimates of the percentage of surplus in each year 
attributable  to systems  of  different  vintages,  principally  those  less than  or 
equal to four and six years old. This partially addresses the concern that new 
products not only are cheaper, but embody new unmeasured  features not re- 
flected in the price, First, as expected, young vintages tend to generate the most 
surplus, averaging 22-47  percent of surplus, depending on the measure. This 
35.  For example, IDC’s censuses show a perceptible decline in the entry of  size-two systems 
after 1976 (Greenstein  1994). Yet  this bias does not explain the time trend in table 8.5 because 
most size-two systems were not included in this sample as a result of the adoption of a consistent 
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result, combined with the inability of technical age to predict system demand, 
suggests  that buyers  purchase  systems for more than just capacity, but  this 
quality is not measurable in a simple manner. Second, the importance of young 
vintages differs dramatically from year to year. A few specific vintages influ- 
ence surplus estimates. The technical vintage  introduced in  1965-66  domi- 
nates the surplus calculations until the mid- 1970s, which unquestionably  re- 
flects the popularity of the IBM system 360. The next major wave of  surplus 
is associated with IBM system 370 (mostly from 1971 and 1973). These two 
vintage effects do not work themselves out until virtually the end of the sam- 
ple, when the entry of many new systems begins to influence the surplus simu- 
lations. 
No other family of  systems generates so much surplus as the systems 360 
and 370 because no other family of  systems has such a large market  share. 
While this qualitative result is not surprising (see Greenstein  1994), it raises 
important issues. First, it suggests that estimates of the benefits from technical 
change in the early years of  computing  are determined by  estimates of  the 
benefits associated with the technical improvements in a few of the dominant 
systems of that era. Only in the later years are the benefits spread across more 
models. Second, it highlights the importance of properly measuring the bene- 
fits associated with the system  3601370. In  any quantity-weighted measure- 
ment exercise, such as the above, small changes in estimates of  the benefits 
associated with the system 3601370 lead to large changes in estimates of the 
benefits to society from technical changes in computing. This observation adds 
importance to the debate about the (measured) economic benefits associated 
with  the  system 370 (e.g.,  see Dulberger  1989; Gordon  1989; and Triplett 
1989) and about whether most of the benefits from technical change accrued 
to buyers. Finally, these results again raise the unresolved  question about the 
proper method for weighting a popular system relative to less commercially 
successful systems in a hedonic regression. 
Table 8.6 puts the pattern  of entry into final perspective. It computes the 
counterfactual  surplus generated if  all new  systems were absent (those less 
than four and six years old). It displays this counterfactual surplus as a fraction 
of buyer’s surplus measured with all the systems. This is in the spirit of welfare 
calculations that keep the demand characteristics fixed but alter the choices 
available to buyers. Removing young systems simulates demand in the absence 
of any technical change.36  Not surprisingly, surplus declines without new sys- 
tems. However, in any given year it does not decline by more than a few per- 
centage  points.  The largest  declines  are  associated  with  the  counterfactual 
elimination of  the  system 360 in the early years of  the  sample. In the mid- 
36. It seems less plausible to estimate the counterfactual surplus in the absence of a system of 
a particular size. In that counterfactual world, there would be a large supplier response in short- 
run pricing behavior and long-run design behavior. Simulating that counterfactual behavior does 
not nvke any point that cannot already be made with the results in table 8.6. 355  From Superminis to Supercomputers 
Table 8.6  Size of Counterfactual Surplus as a Percentage of Observed Surplus 
Techage 5 4  Techage 5 6 











































1970s the decline is less than  1 percent  and less than  3  percent  by the late 
1970s, especially for young systems. 
Table  8.6 displays  a  well-known  characteristic  of  counterfactual  welfare 
measures of technical change: a new technology is only as good as the alterna- 
tives to it are bad. Even if no new systems were invented, buyers would con- 
tinue to use old technology. In this model, old systems are very close substi- 
tutes, and switching between substitutes is assumed to be costless. The product 
space is “crowded” as a result, so that the absence of  a new technology sends 
buyers to a worse, but lower-priced, system. Since entry on the intensive mar- 
gins can only generate large gains when the product space is not crowded, the 
biggest  gains to such entry in this model  are recorded  early in the  sample, 
when the industry is still young. Since this crowding is probably an artifact of 
not measuring all the dimensions that buyers value, and table 8.5 shows that a 
substantial number of buyers continue to purchase  young systems, table 8.6 
represents a (potentially severe) underestimate of the true surplus losses. 
Table 8.6 echoes the observation that innovation takes a long time to achieve 
its full effect (only here it is about the entry of new systems). Though the net 
benefit from new systems is small in any given year, the cumulative effect over 
many years is quite large. That is, if all technical change had ceased in 1968, 
by  1981 the cumulative losses in each year would have been enormous. How- 
ever, not to belabor the point, the long-run estimate of loss is surely an underes- 
timate. Much evidence suggests that important product characteristics are not 
being  measured  here. The amount of mismeasurement  must increase as the 
time periods in comparison become further apart. 
Tables 8.5 and 8.6 embody both the  strengths and weaknesses  of  the ap- 356  Shane M. Greenstein 
proach taken in this paper. On the one hand, standard hedonic methods could 
not lead to these tables or to the conclusions reached from them. Table 8.6 
quantifies the benefits from new technology in use, while hedonic price meth- 
ods stop at estimating improvements in what is available. Though this paper’s 
conclusions require structural assumptions about the nature of demand. this is 
par for the course in using data on both quantities and prices. Any other struc- 
tural model that incorporates more dimensions will necessarily show the same 
effects highlighted in this paper and possibly more. On the downside, tables 
8.5 and 8.6 are only as good as the structural assumptions that generated them. 
Parts of this paper (and other analyses of  this market, e.g., Bresnahan and 
Greenstein 1992) suggest that product differentiation is incompletely modeled 
here and potentially correlated with age. Entry probably also occurred on more 
extensive margins than are modeled. If that is so, tables 8.5 and 8.6 provide a 
lower bound on the welfare losses from the absence of innovation. 
8.7.5  Cost Function Decline 
Table 8.7 estimates cost functions on exactly the same data as were used in 
table 8.3.  The two equations use something akin to standard hedonic specifica- 
tions but supplement them with a market-power correction, as found in a verti- 
cal model with conjectural variations. The first specification takes the form 
(7) 
The next  specification is similar, but  specifies  a different r over time. The 
market  size, M, is assumed to be  about  1 percent  larger than  the observed 
market, taken from the previous conjectural-variation estimates in table 8.3.” 
All the data are pooled such that a  has one coefficient for MIPS, memory, and 
age, but different year-dummy coefficients, which captures the change in the 
level of the cost function of firms.’* This assumes that all firms draw from the 
same cost function in a given year. Rather than explicitly model the demand 
size, which is of little interest here, the estimates employ a reduced form for 
demand. Demand is a function of the same set of regressors and instruments 
as used previously, plus time dummies. This treats MIPS, memory, age, and 
market power as endogenous and the time dummies as exogenous. 
The cost function estimates have the following three features: First, coeffi- 
cients for memory, MIPS, and age all have the correct sign. Second, none of 
37. The above results suggest that little IS lost by estimating a conjectural-variation model as if 
M is known (even when it is not). In any event, in a conjectural-variation model, the conjectural 
parameter would scale any estimate, effectively acting in the opposite direction of any estimate of 
the market size. Hence, it is must easier, and no less insightful. to simply assume a given size of a 
market, compute the implied product elasticities, and then estimate a conjecture parameter to scale 
the elasticity estimates properly. 
38. Though the dummy coefficients are unbiased estimates, the index will not be. It is a nonlin- 
ear function of an unbiased estimate. To correct for this bias, the estimated standard errors use an 
approximation suggested by Triplett (1989).  This involves adding one-half of the standard error to 
the coefficient before computing the index. Table 8.7  Cost-Function Estimates 
Sample Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  Variance  Minimum  Maximum 
Year  1975.88  16  3.8561  14.8696  1968  1981 
Memory  2.4305  5.4442  29.6394  0.0080  65.5360 
MIPS  0.8553  3.5653  12.71 10  0.1000  99.0000 
In(price)  -3.0553  1.0447  1.0913  -5.6011  -0.4409 
Techage  7.2617  4.5623  20.8143  0.2500  22.0000 
Correlation of Variables 
Variable  Memory  MIPS 
MIPS  0.2427  1562 
Techage  -0.25643255  -0.129868 14 
In(price)  0.26571416  0.22847909  -0.14177210 
Specification 1 
Valid cases = 1,436 
R2  0.218 
Residual SS = 4,315.12 
Dependent variable = In(price) 
R2  = 0.209 
Standard error of  estimates = 1.744 
Variable 
Standard  Real Cost 





































0.0471  ** 
0.0763* 
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~~  ~  ~~ 
Table 8.7  (continued) 
Specification 2 
Valid cases = 1,436 
R'  = 0.193 
Residual SS = 6,367.5 
Dependent variable = In(price) 
Standard error of  estimates = 2.120 
Rz  = 0.182 
Variable 
Standard  Real Cost 











































































*f = value exceeds 1.96. 
**r  = value exceeds 2.56. 
the estimates shows a monotonically declining rate of technical change. The 
most problematic of  all the estimates are those for 1968 through 1970, which 
may be due to changes in IDC's sampling frame in those years. This problem 
does not seem to be a manifestation of the movement from the IBM 360 to the 
IBM 370, which was first introduced in 1971. Third, all the estimates measure 
rapid rates of  technical change over the long run. The first equation, which 
estimates only one conjecture parameter for the entire sample, finds a decline 
in the cost function of 20.0 percent over fourteen years and 30.3 percent from 
197  1 to  1981. The second equation, which estimates  a different conjecture 
parameter for each of the three IDC sampling periods, estimates declines of 
11.7 percent over fourteen years and 25.5 percent from  1971 to  1981.39  The 
39. Interacting a time trend with the conjecture pararncter did not result in qualitatively different 
conclusions. The first equation is presented because it is easier to read and interpret. 359  From Superminis to Supercomputers 
differences in the estimates suggest that functional form influences the precise 
estimate of  change in market power and the change in the cost function. In 
both cases, decreases in the prices to consumers were due partly to changes in 
market power and partly to declines in the cost function.40 
8.8  Conclusion 
This paper measures the economic benefits that accrued to buyers from tech- 
nical innovation in mainframe computers. The thesis is that many innovations 
that created economic value in this period are associated  with extensions in 
computing capabilities. Answers  to the questions raised  in the introduction 
provide a suitable summary of this analysis. 
What valuable innovations in this period are associated with extensions of 
capabilities? It was argued that technical change in the computing market in- 
volved  much more than rapid  declines in the price of  existing  capabilities. 
While price declines enabled many  of the events that took place, important 
episodes  of  value  creation  were  associated  with  specific  inventions  that 
extended  buyer  capabilities  into new  areas-for  example, the invention  of 
reliable  real-time  database querying and  the invention  of  interruption-free 
multiuser computing. Value creation was not associated solely with the decline 
in costs of the delivery of these services. 
Do buyers adopt products that embody extensions of capabilities? The eco- 
nomic history and the econometric results show that adoption decisions were 
not solely the result of buyers taking  advantage of lower prices for existing 
capabilities. The data and estimates show that many buyers purchased larger 
computing capacity  embodied in  products  that  came into existence in  the 
1970s. 
How does a measurement  framework represent that action? This study ar- 
gued that some fraction of the new capabilities associated with new systems is 
not measurable but is complementary  with increases in computing capacity. 
Therefore, a model of the supply and demand for products with different com- 
puting capacity will capture some demand for new capabilities. Such a model 
has several interesting features: (1  ) buyers slowly adopt higher-capacity  sys- 
tems, suggesting that greater attention needs to be paid to the diffusion of  new 
technology in this market (Greenstein 1994); (2)  decreases in prices to con- 
sumers were due partly to changes in market power and partly to declines in 
cost. All the estimates measure rapid rates of  decline in the costs of providing 
computer capacity over the long run. 
40. Finally, it is not correct to infer that market power increased over time just because  in- 
creased. Instead, one must examine changes in  the distribution of  product-specific elasticities. 
Close examination of these elasticities, not shown here, reveals a more competitive market over 
time-in  the sense that the median product-specific elasticity is more elastic, as is every other 
order statistic of the elasticity. This is not surprising in this model since the product space becomes 
increasingly crowded over time. 360  Shane M. Greenstein 
Are most extensions only embodied in capacity or other features of the prod- 
ucts? Competition in computing is partially represented by extensions in com- 
puting capacity and by the technological age of systems, but not entirely. The 
conjectural-variation estimates  and the demand-parameter  estimates suggest 
that there was not a stable relationship over time between measurable features 
of products and revealed buyer choice. This is not surprising because of  the 
well-known changing value of outside goods. It is also not surprising because 
of the likely changing valuation of computing capacity that resulted from inno- 
vation of complementary components. Therefore, constant-quality indexes of 
price decline potentially  omit the factors that influence changes to economic 
welfare for many buyers. 
In sum, much significant innovation  in this  industry  was associated with 
extending capabilities to new levels. This is not  an argument that price de- 
creases were unimportant to buyers, only that price decreases do not tell the 
whole story about the welfare improvements realized by buyers-perhaps  they 
even tell a deceptive story. There are many implications from this conclusion 
for understanding competition  and value creation in this  industry (e.g.,  see 
Bresnahan  and Greenstein  1992). This study focuses  on whether constant- 
quality price indexes provide  good information about welfare benefits from 
technological change. They do for the buyers who continue to buy products 
with similar sets of characteristics, but not necessarily for the buyers who take 
advantage of the availability of characteristics that did not previously  exist. 
Many buyers fall into this latter camp. It is time that these observations about 
extension of capabilities became a central part of the discussion about the cre- 
ation of economic benefits from technological change in computing. 
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Comment  Erik Brynjolfsson 
The proliferation of new goods in the economy over the past several decades 
has been indirectly enabled by a ten-thousand-fold improvement in the perfor- 
mance of computer technology.  Computers give companies the capability to 
manage the complexity  of  developing, producing,  marketing,  and servicing 
ever more products. They are new goods which enable even more new goods. 
Of course, in addition to this indirect effect, the unprecedented improvement 
in the underlying technology has had a direct impact on the computer industry 
itself, where new generations of products arrive at a pace measured in months. 
Shane Greenstein has undertaken the important  job of estimating the contri- 
bution that new mainframes made to welfare in the 1970s, when they were the 
dominant class of computers. This is not an easy task. The evolution of this 
paper through three revisions and three presentations reflects substantial effort. 
This paper reflects state-of-the-art research, and the basic thesis, that growth 
on the extensive margin is a major source of surplus in the mainframe comput- 
ing market, is sensible. Nonetheless, one of the lessons I take from this paper 
is that the methods applied must be used with great care. We do not yet have a 
“silver bullet” for evaluating the value of new goods. This point can be best 
illustrated by  stepping back  and putting the reported  results  in perspective. 
Accordingly, after summarizing some of the main contributions of Greenstein’s 
paper, I will contrast them to the inferences that could be made from a some- 
what simpler look at the data. 
This paper has a number of strengths. First, Greenstein has chosen a criti- 
cally important topic. Computers are an increasingly large contributor to eco- 
nomic welfare, and the main hypothesis of the paper, that extending the capa- 
bilities of computers is important, is clearly on target. 
Second, the paper makes use of  a very promising, underexploited data set 
which provides broad coverage of the rental prices of  mainframes and their 
installed base. Identifying and working with this kind of detailed data is not 
easy and needs to be commended whenever it is done. Often, a great deal can 
be learned by even a first pass through  such data. Indeed, the simple plot in 
figure 8.2 makes the key point that mainframe capabilities  have grown over 
time nearly as effectively as the tables derived from more detailed calculations. 
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Third, this paper represents the first use outside of the automobile industry 
of some of the tools developed by  Bresnahan (1987) and Berry (1994). The 
mainframe market seems as though it might be fertile ground for these tools 
insofar as vertical differentiation is an important characteristic of this market. 
There is a large spread in the power of systems, whether measured by the speed 
of the CPU, the amount of random access memory, or the storage capacity, and 
that power is highly correlated with the price of the systems. Of course, hori- 
zontal  differentiation is also important in this industry; how much this  will 
affect the results is difficult to know in advance. 
Fourth,  Greenstein  demonstrates  some technical innovations  which over- 
come a number of difficulties  with the data and help account for some im- 
portant features of the mainframe market. For example, by including a conjec- 
tural-variation parameter to account for competitive response to price changes, 
Greenstein’s model is an improvement over the hedonic approach which typi- 
cally assumes a constant markup. As a result, he is able to present evidence 
that some of the decline in prices in mainframes may have been due either to an 
erosion of IBM’s monopoly power or to the diminution of network externalities 
associated with the value of the IBM standard. Another technical innovation is 
adapting the Bresnahan-Berry model to a data set with some missing observa- 
tions. Greenstein also had to do some work to derive reasonable-looking cost 
functions. By judiciously adding some additional constraints to the model, cost 
declines became evident on an order of magnitude that is comparable to that 
found in hedonic models. 
With  all these  strengths, the ingredients  are in place  for some important 
results. The reported results can be grouped into three sets. The main finding 
was that entry on the extensive margin was economically significant. A careful 
reading of  the last column of  table 8.4 indicates that mainframes generated 
over one thousand million  (i.e.,  one billion) dollars of  surplus per month in 
1981, or about $13 billion per year. Table 8.5 shows that the larger mainframes 
accounted for an increasing share of this amount: the surplus due to class seven 
mainframes, IDCS largest category, rose from 1 to 14 percent. 
Second, while  Greenstein  finds  evidence  that  the  extensive  margin  was 
growing in importance, his results also imply that neither consumers nor pro- 
ducers benefited much overall. Table 8.4 suggests that the total surplus in this 
market has declined over time, despite a rapid increase in spending and the 
installed base. This finding is particularly striking given the increases in prod- 
uct quality which we know to have occurred in this industry and which are 
confirmed in table 8.7. Interestingly, note 40 reports that the decline in surplus 
cannot be attributed to more-monopolistic pricing. Indeed, producers also lost 
out: competition increased in this market as measured by median product elas- 
ticity. ‘ 
1. For IBM, by far the biggest mainframe producer, the worst was yet to come. See Bresnahan 
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The final set of results suggests that diffusion was slow and the new systems 
added little to surplus. Amazingly, the model predicts that if all systems less 
than four years old were removed from the market in 1981, surplus would have 
been reduced only by 1.6 percent! 
While each of these results was derived by the careful application of state- 
of-the-art theory to the best available data, they are subject to important quali- 
fications. In particular, several of these results call for closer scrutiny because 
they are not consistent with some of  the conventional  wisdom regarding the 
market for mainframe computers. For example, the welfare estimates, while 
large, may still be too low; the reported decline in surplus over time is suspect; 
and the small welfare contribution of new goods (less than four years old) is 
almost certainly incorrect, or at least misleading, given the blazing technologi- 
cal advances in this industry. While it is always interesting to see long-held 
beliefs challenged, in this match, I think the weight of the evidence will still 
be found to be on the side of the conventional wisdom. 
Let’s begin by  looking more closely  at the estimates of  total surplus. It is 
useful to compare  Greenstein’s analysis with  a simpler benchmark  estimate 
based on the demand curve implied by  the decline in the price of  computer 
power and  the concurrent  increase  in the quantity  of computer  power  pur- 
chased. This approach will make some different assumptions which highlight 
the role of price declines in creating welfare benefits (as opposed to extensions 
in the product space). 
To  simplify the analysis, suppose that the computer power that can be pur- 
chased for a dollar has similar welfare characteristics, regardless of where that 
dollar is spent. In other words, a key departure from Greenstein’s approach is 
that we now make the assumption that the ratio of surplus to spending is unaf- 
fected by the mix of big systems and smaller systems in a given year.*  We shall 
see below that this assumption does not appear to be far from the truth. The 
resulting welfare estimates will not be strictly comparable to Greenstein’s but 
can be used to put his estimates in per~pective.~ 
Over the past several years, one well-documented feature in the computing 
sector has been dramatic decline in the cost of computing: on the order of 20 
percent  per  year  (e.g.,  see Gordon  1993). In  theory, price  declines  can be 
caused by shifts in either supply or demand, but there can be little doubt that 
this magnitude of decline must be due almost entirely to one thing: technical 
change in the production function. In fact, technical change in the computer 
industry  is relatively  well-understood  and is remarkably predictable  (Grove 
1990). A rather fortuitous combination  of  physics,  geometry,  and materials 
science has enabled microchip performance to double every eighteen months 
for the past three decades. 
2. This is not the same as the stronger assumptions that surplus per computer or surplus per unit 
3. The results will be more comparable to those of  Bresnahdn (1986) and Brynjolfsson (1993, 
of computer power are constant. 
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Mainframe price versus quantity, 1968-1981 
Given this knowledge of the underlying dynamics of price change, there is 
less need for the traditional agnosticism of economists regarding the source of 
the price changes derived from hedonic estimates (e.g., Griliches 1990, 189). 
Clearly, the steady decline in the price of computer power is due mainly to a 
shift of the supply curve, and this is consistent with Greenstein’s cost function 
estimates for the mainframe market. 
This knowledge enables us to identify a benchmark demand curve, as sug- 
gested by figures 8C.  1 and 8C.2, using the values for price and quantity based 
on Greenstein’s tables 8.7 and 8.4, respectively. Indeed, demand appears to be 
well fit by the traditional log-linear specification: 
q = eYpays, 
where q is quantity  (based on Greenstein’s table  8.4), p  is price  (based on 
Greenstein’s table 8.7), y is income (from real gross domestic product reported 
by the Council of Economic Advisers 1992)  and y, a,  and 6 are parameters. The 
parameter estimates, based on a simple regression, are reported in table 8C.1. 
Given such an estimate of demand it is easy to generate a straightforward 
estimate  of  exact  consumer’s  surplus  (Hausman  198  This  back-of-the- 
envelope calculation suggests that the increase in consumer’s surplus attribut- 
4.  The increase in exact consumer’s surplus from a price change from po  to pI  is given by 
{(l-6)[eQ[+m  -  p:+=)/(l + a)]  + y(1 -  6)}/(1 -  6 -  y). 
In principle, this approach should capture some of the benefits of  new goods through the increase 
in quantity sold, but it will be an underestimate if these new goods contribute disproportionately 
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log(Quantity) 
Fig. 8C.2  Log (price) versus log (quantity), with regression line 
Table 8C.1  Regression Estimates for the Demand for Mainframe Computers as a 
Function of Price 
Dependent variable = LQUANT8l 
Sample range = 1968-1981 
N=  14 
R’  = 0.994 
Adjusted R2 = 0.993 
Standard error of regression = 0.0963 
F-statistic = 912 
Mean of  dependent = 7.29 
Standard deviation of dependent = 1.14 
Sum of squared residuals = 0.102 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  r-statistic  2-Tail Significance 
C  -11.9  8.63  -  1.38  0.194 
LPRICE81  -1.05  0.0677  -  1.5.6  0.000 
LGDP  1.44  0.573  2.52  0.029 
able to the price decline in mainframe computer power between 1968 and 198  1 
was about $43.9 billion in 1981.5  This is likely to be an underestimate of sur- 
plus, since, inter alia, some allowance should be made for the fact that, due to 
diffusion, the demand curve probably shifted outward somewhat over this pe- 
riod, beyond the increase in GNP. 
5. Log-linear demand is also consistent with the application of the index number method used 
by Bresnahan (l986), which gives a slightly higher estimate of about $49.2 billion. Either figure 
is consistent with the finding in Brynjolfsson (1993) that consumer’s surplus in the overall com- 
puter market amounts to three to four times expenditures. Another interesting point of  reference 
is IBM’s 1981 net income of $4.4 billion and 60.2 percent gross margins. 367  From Superminis to Supercomputers 
What  can  we  learn  from  such  a  benchmark  estimate?  In  comparison, 
Greenstein estimates that surplus from  advances in the extensive  margin of 
computing was $13 billion for  1981. This benchmark  exercise supports his 
contention that the extensive  margin  was an important component of  main- 
frames’ contributions to economic welfare, although perhaps  less important 
than I would previously have guessed.6 Because Greenstein’s surplus estimates 
are based on a changing definition of the “outside good” over time, it is diffi- 
cult to interpret the figures much further. 
However, as Greenstein notes, his method should lend itself more fruitfully 
to relative comparisons, such as the proportion of welfare generated by com- 
puters of various sizes. In particular, he reports that 14 percent of  surplus is 
generated by the 5 percent of units in the highest size class in 1981. This ap- 
pears to suggest that large systems contribute disproportionately to welfare. 
However, this statistic must be interpreted carefully. Since large units are much 
costlier, a more relevant comparison would be the amount of welfare generated 
versus the dollars spent on these units. Greenstein has stated that the largest 
computers also account for about 14 percent of spending in 1981, so ironically, 
this suggests that, in terms of  surplus, perhaps large systems can be modeled 
as “clumps” of small systems. If this is the case generally, then the benchmark 
surplus estimates derived above may not be far from the truth. 
It is important to note, however, that without Greenstein’s analysis, the as- 
sumption that welfare was proportional to spending for large systems could 
not have been tested. It is certainly not true that mainframes are technologically 
equal to collections of  smaller machines in cost per unit of computer power. 
Since we know that mainframe users pay a higher unit price for their computer 
power, they must also be getting greater benefits. These benefits need not nec- 
essarily  scale up proportionately,  since, because  of  indivisibilities  in  many 
computational tasks, one cannot fully arbitrage processing power on PCs for 
processing on mainframes, client-server architectures notwithstanding. 
If the amount of surplus attributable to large systems seems broadly consis- 
tent with what we know about the mainframe market, the reported decline in 
measured surplus over time is more difficult to explain, especially given the 
rising expenditures on mainframes and their growing capabilities. One possi- 
bility is that because the measured benefit is net of outside good, this result 
could be a function of the powerful minicomputers encroaching on the main- 
frame market. It is true that mainframe software was ported to many minicom- 
puters in the 1970s and the data set is missing many of these machines, particu- 
larly in DEC’s VAX line. However, total expenditure on mainframes continued 
6.  My spoken comments on the two previous versions of his paper were much less supportive 
of his main result. Based on a similar benchmark analysis, I then argued that his estimates were 
probably  off  by  at  least  an  order  of  magnitude.  However, in the  latest version of  the paper, 
Greenstein’s  original estimates of $1-2  billion per yeur have been updated to be $1-2 billion per 
month. Since his original calculations were internally consistent, this fact might never have been 
noticed without the “reality check’ provided by the benchmark method. 368  Shane M. Greenstein 
to rise over this period, leading Greenstein to discount the role of  increasing 
capabilities of the “outside good” as an explanation. 
Nonetheless, a slightly more complex story may be viable. Begin by noting 
that the Greenstein model measures the marginal surplus associated with the 
last bit of computing power, not the average or total surplus. As the portion of 
the  vertically  differentiated  product  space  occupied  by  mainframes  moved 
“up,” it is possible that the marginal surplus from mainframe computing de- 
clined, although the total benefits of computers might have been increasing. A 
related  story could be told in which increasingly less-valuable  niches in the 
mainframe market were gradually filled over time, leading to lower marginal 
benefit but increasing total surplus.’ 
However, I agree with Greenstein that the most compelling explanation for 
the decline in measured surplus is the growing importance of horizontal differ- 
entiation. The rise of the horizontal differential suggests that there are many 
extensive  margins  to  the  computing  market  and  that  a  one-dimensional 
vertical-differentiation  model is too simple in this application. In fact, much of 
the value to consumers probably came from the new uses of low end computers 
that were enabled by complementary innovations in software and other prod- 
ucts. In the 1970s, this meant dedicated word-processing  systems and special- 
purpose minicomputer packages. In the 1980s, personal computers were made 
valuable by dozens of new applications and markets. In the  1990s, it appears 
that game machines and “smart” cable-television  boxes may create some of 
the biggest fortunes and consumer benefits.x 
As suggested by  figure 8C.3, marketing experts in the computer industry, 
such as former Apple CEO John Sculley, do not tend to think of the product 
space as being most meaningfully described by a single vertical dimension. 
While there are numerous extensive margins in “Sculley space,” mainframes 
don’t appear to be on any of  them. To  put it another way, given the general- 
purpose nature of computer power, it seems unlikely  that vendors and users 
would soon exhaust its potential for new applications and new markets even 
if  there were no further advances in the power delivered  at the high end of 
the market. 
Because the product space may be getting more crowded in the horizontal 
dimension as different products address different markets but do so with com- 
parable amounts of computing power, the vertical-differentiation  model may 
7. If the definition of the outside good had remained fixed in absolute terms, instead of changing 
each year, the increase in total surplus would have been more evident. This is apparent in figure 8.2. 
8. The term “low end’  is only relative: Nintendo’s 64 video game player, scheduled for release 
in early 1996 at a price of $300, is aimed at providing three-dimensional “virtual reality” gaming 
for young teenage boys. To address this new application, the machine uses a 64-bit microprocessor 
running at 100 Megahertz which delivers 125 MIPS of raw computing power. In contrast, the most 
powerful mainframe available in  1980 (in Greenstein’s sample), delivered  15 MIPS for a rental 
price of about $350,000 a month. (Of course, MIPS is only one measure of a computer’s power.) CABLE NETWORKS 
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Fig. 8C.3  Merger mania: the information industry in 2001 
Source: Survey of the Computer Indusiry, 27 February 1993. 59. 0  1993 The Economist Newspaper Group, Inc. Reprinted with permis- 
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not be valid even for relative comparisons over time. For instance, Greenstein’s 
finding that the market appears to be growing more competitive may simply 
be an artifact of neighbors  in the vertical  dimension looking like substitutes 
even when they are not. 
Growing horizontal differentiation can also account for the counterintuitive 
finding that new systems (less than four years old) added so little to surplus in 
any given year. A vertical-differentiation model will underestimate the contri- 
bution of new goods when it assumes that a new Wang word-processing system 
merely substitutes for an old IBM transaction-processing  system with compa- 
rable processing power. This makes it look like eliminating Wang would not 
have affected welfare much. 
In  comparison,  the benchmark  welfare contribution  of  the price  declines 
embodied in new technologies are apparently much larger. For instance, a 20 
percent decline in prices between  1980 and 1981 would have increased exact 
consumer welfare by  $3 billion, or 7.5 percent, using the demand-curve esti- 
mates presented above. 
What can we learn from this work? Certainly Greenstein has addressed an 
important  problem  and valuable insights  spring from his data and analyses. 
Perhaps most importantly, Greenstein’s paper underscores  both the  strengths 
and the weaknesses of the vertical-differentiation  models and will set future 
work on a firmer foundation. While the interpretation of the absolute value of 
the surplus estimates derived is difficult, it appears that relative comparisons 
can be more meaningful. For instance, one of Greenstein’s most important con- 
tributions is in establishing that the welfare contributions of very large classes 
of mainframes are significant, although not necessarily disproportionate to ex- 
penditures  on them.  On the other hand,  the counterfactual  estimates  of  the 
welfare losses from eliminating  machines of recent vintages  are almost cer- 
tainly too low. This highlights the fact that a vertical-differentiation model will 
underestimate the surplus contribution of new goods when horizontal differen- 
tiation is important.  Unfortunately, it  seems as though  this will  become  an 
increasingly important weakness as more new goods appear in the economy 
which cannot be differentiated solely by a one-dimensional quality metric. 
The somewhat humbling message is that our tools are still fairly blunt. Esti- 
mating the value of new goods may still be an area in which economics is a 
one-digit science. Accordingly, whenever possible we will need to use multiple 
methods to triangulate on an answer. My own bias is that a simple pass through 
new detailed data may often be one of the most informative approaches. For 
example, Greenstein’s figure 8.2 told most of the story of his paper and struck 
me as a more reliable basis for practical inference than some of the more so- 
phisticated analytical results he also presented. A related point is that reason- 
ableness checks based on knowledge  of the specific domain being analyzed 
can tell us whether our estimates are at least in the right order of magnitude. 
Insights flow not only from models to our knowledge of the world, but also in 
the reverse direction. 371  From Superminis to Supercomputers 
The economy is evolving in directions that make this type of  analysis in- 
creasingly critical and I certainly expect that it will be successfully applied 
again in future empirical work. For most goods, looking only at price declines 
may  miss most of  the welfare benefits.  Perhaps the computer market is one 
place where the simple price-decline approach does not do too much injustice. 
More likely, a focus solely on either price declines or vertical differentiation 
will miss important features of the market: future work will need to look at 
margins in other dimensions. In  any case, Greenstein’s paper unquestionably 
advances  the  extensive margin  of  economic  research  on  the  value  of  new 
goods. 
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